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Abstract
In this paper we are interested in two points in Require-
ment Engineering : modelization of requirements and dis-
tribution of requirements. We represent requirements as or-
ders on possible situations, which allows one to have a rep-
resentation of less ideal cases. Using this formalization, we
distribute requirements among a group of executing agents,
for which an agency model is defined.
1. Introduction
Requirements Engineering (RE) describes the process
which leads to the production of specifications, or require-
ments, about a software to be build. In [10], Pohl presents
RE as a three-dimensions space: specification, representa-
tion, agreement. The specification dimension represents the
degree of specification which varies from opaque (the ini-
tial needs) to complete. The representation dimension deals
with the different ways to represent knowledge about the
software and its environment. There are three categories
of representations: informal (natural language, graphics...),
semi-formal (SADT, UML...) and formal (specification lan-
guages, knowledge languages...). The agreement dimension
represents the fact that all the participants in the RE process
must agree on the specifications.
All those dimensions do not deal with the moment when
we will begin the implementation of the software. Accord-
ing to us, adding a fourth dimension is interesting. This
dimension concerns the distribution of requirements among
a group of executing agents, those who will effectively build
the software. In [4], Easterbrook notices that validation is
an important part of requirements engineering, but cannot
be formalized. Formalizing the distribution of requirements
could be a way to “pre-validate” those requirements at a de-
sign level. If the requirements cannot be distributed entirely,
the software cannot be build. Furthermore, this could serve
as a basis to build a plan for development.
In this paper, we are only interested in the representa-
tion dimension and the distribution of requirements among
a group of executing agents. In this work, we occult
the agreement phase and we consider the requirements as
elicited, i.e. the persons involved in the RE process agree
on the requirements representation. Notice that eliciting re-
quirements can be viewed as a merging of the participants
views. There are different kinds of merging, and a judi-
cious one for requirements would be majority merging [6],
in which the merging process elicits a requirements if it is
supported by the majority of the participants.
More, in this present paper we are not interested in the
evolution of requirements. If it is proved that an agreement
cannot be achieved, a negotiation phase must be initiated,
after which the participants views (including the executing
agents views) should be updated [13, 9].
The first point developed in this paper is the representa-
tion of requirements. Consider a requirement emitted by a
participant of the form “I want the software to verify prop-
erty
 
”. We think that when such a sentence is emitted by
a participant, it may not only think about the property
 
(what is ideal for it), but he may think about the less ideal
cases cases. For instance, it may think that, if the situa-
tion where
 
is not verified occurs, then it prefers that  is
verified. An adequate formalism to represent requirements
must offer a representation of both ideal and less ideal situ-
ations. Our formalization is based on the logic  , a logic
of preferences developed by Craig Boutilier [1], because its
semantics allows to represent orders among situations.
The second point we study in this paper is the distribu-
tion of requirements among a group of executing agents.
The distribution process consists in calculating the goals of
the executing agents from the set of requirements. To dis-
tribute requirements among agents, we need a model of the
agent. The main approach to capture the notion of ratio-
nality of an agent is the BDI (for Belief, Desire, Intention)
architecture [11, 12]. In this work, we consider only three
notions to modelize the agents: their knowledge of the real
world, which is supposed to be common to all agents, their
abilities and their commitments. To calculate the goals of
the group of executing agents and of each agent, we use the
logic   again.
This paper is organized as follows. In the second sec-
tion, we present the logic   and our representation of
requirements. In section 3, we study the mechanism of goal
derivation for one agent. Then in section 4, we extend this
mechanism to a group of agent by redefining first the notion
of goal for a group of agents. We define next the notion of
commitment for an agent, how to deduce an agent’s effec-
tive goals from a set of requirements and we study an ex-
ample. Finally, we present our conclusions and future work
prospects in section 5.
2. Expressing Requirements with
 
In this section , we present   , a logic of preferences
developed by Craig Boutilier. We only recall its semantics,
the axiomatic being described in [1]. Then we present our
formalization or requirements using  .
2.1. The logic  
Boutilier assumes a propositional bimodal language over
a set of atomic propositional variables  , with the
usual connectives and two modal operators denoted 	 and


	 . The semantic of   is based on models of the form

where

is a set of worlds,  is a valua-
tion function which associates any propositional letter with
a set of worlds in which it is true, and  is a total preorder
on worlds (i.e. a reflexive, transitive and connected binary
relation over
 ).  ﬀ means that  is at least as pre-
ferred as  . A constraint is imposed on the   models.
We recall it after giving the definition of the valuation of a
formula.
Let
ﬁﬀﬂﬃ be a   model. The valuation of
a formula in M is given by the following definition:
Definition 1. 
  "!
iff # %$&'  )(*! for any
formula !

+ 
(
!
iff ,$-/.ﬂ!10 for any propositional letter !

+ )(321!
iff 54 )(! for any formula !

ﬁ )(&.ﬂ!16879!;:<0
iff ﬁ )(!16 and = )(!;: , if !>6
and !/: are formulas

+ 
(
	
!
iff for all  so that  ? , @ AB!

+ )(


	
!
iff for all  so that 'C  , D  A !
Thus, 	
!
is true in a world  iff ! is true in all the worlds
at least as preferred as  . And


	 is true in a world  iff !
is true in all the worlds less preferred than

. As usual, the
dual operators E and


E are defined by E !GFHJILKM2 	 21!
and


E
!3F)HJILKN2


	
21!
.
Boutilier also defines O 	 !PF)HJIQK 	 !;7


	
!
and O E
!3F)HJILK
E
!;R


E
!
.
The constraint imposed on every   model  is the
following: for every satisfaisable formula S of   ,
there is at least one world  so that @ ( S .
For instance, let us consider a model

consisting of 4
worlds
 6
,
 :
,
UT
and
WV
ordered as follows:
XZY X\[ X\] X_^
` a b cd`a e `
c
a b cd`
c
a
Then
ﬁ )(
[
	gf since every world at least as preferred
as
U:
satisfies f .
Definition 2. As usual, we say that  satisfies a formula
!
iff h i! . Let j be a set of formulas and ! a formula
of   . We say that ! is derived (or deduced) from j iff
any model

which satisfies j also satisfies ! . We note it
j
 k!
.
2.2. Expressing preferences
In order to express conditional or absolute preferences,
Boutilier defines a conditional connective l
.Lmn omp0
by the
following definition:
Definition 3. l . f  qr0&F)HJILK O 	 21qsR OE .ﬂq-7 	 .tqvu f 0L0
et l
.ﬂqs0wF)HJIQK
l
.tqx y0
where y is any propositional tau-
tology.
We can interpret l
.
f
 qr0
by “if
q
is true then we prefer f
to be true”. l
.tqr0
means that the most preferred worlds are
q
-worlds.
We can wonder why we do not use the operator l .zmn {mp0
to express requirements. Our point of view is that l
.zmn {mp0
is not strict enough to deal with requirements. For instance:
XZY X\[ X|] X\^
`
a e
cd`
a e
c}`
c
a b
`
c
a
is a model of l
.ﬂqs0
although the least preferred world is a
q
world.
Boutilier also defines a notion of strict preference, i.e.
if some proposition
q
is more desirable than its negation,
we can assert
O
	
.tqﬀu
	
qs0
. This modelization corre-
sponds to the notion of requirements. Unfortunately, two
strict preferencescannot be mixed, i.e. there is no model for
O
	
.ﬂq u
	
qr0z7
O
	
.
f
u
	gf
0
for instance.
  is a tool to express orders on worlds. Preferences,
as defined by Boutilier, are not sufficient to modelize re-
quirements. We present in the next sections our modeliza-
tion of requirements. We focus on two type of requirements:
absolute requirements and conditional requirements.
2.3. Absolute Requirements
First, we want to modelize absolute requirements, i.e.
sentences of the form “I want the software to satisfy the
property
q
”. In our approach, we use ordered worlds, so
we need first to explain intuitively how we can represent
absolute requirements with an order on worlds.
According to us, the signification of the sentence “I want
the software to satisfy the property
q
” is the following: for
every
21q
world (i.e. a world that satisfies 21q )    :
 all the less preferred worlds are 21q worlds
 there is a
q
world   at least as preferred as    so that
all the worlds at least as preferred as   are q worlds.
We note an absolute requirement on the property q j .tqr0 .
The formal definition is:
Definition 4.
j
.tqr0>F
HJILK
O
	
.21q u .


	
21q)7
Ew	
qr0L0
2.4. Conditional Requirements
In this work, we call “conditional requirement” a sen-
tence of the form “I want the software to satisfy property
q
if f is true”, noted j .tqx f 0 . The easiest modelization would
be j .tqx f 0 F)HJIQK j . f uDqr0 , but this definition prevent us
from expressing for instance j
.ﬂqﬃ 
f
0W7
j
.ﬂ21qx 2
f
0
. If we
want a model  to reflect the sentence j .ﬂqﬃ f 0 , we want the
worlds to be ordered as following:
 there is a world that verifies
.ﬂq)7
f
0
 all the worlds less preferred than this world are
.ﬂ21qR
2
f
0
worlds
 all the worlds at least as preferred as this world verify
.
f
u qr0
This representation is intuitively correct (a world that
verifies
.ﬂq 7
f
0
cannot be less preferred than a .ﬂ21q 7 f 0
world...) and we can combine multiple conditional require-
ments. The formal definition follows.
Definition 5.
j
.ﬂqx 
f
0>F
HJIQK
O
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f
0L7
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For instance, let us consider the model  :
XZY X\[ X|] X\^
` a  cd`
c
a e c}`a  `
c
a

is a model of j
.ﬂqﬃ 
f
0Q7
j
.21qﬃ 2
f
0
. This model satisfies
j
.tqx 
f
0
because:
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Y
qp7
f
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2.5. Properties of j .zmp0 and j .Lmn omp0
In this section, we examine some properties of the two
operators j
.zmp0
et j
.zmn {mp0
.
Property 1.
 
j
.tqr0 uP2
j
.21qr0
 
j
.tqr0x7
j
.
f
0>u
j
.ﬂqp7
f
0
The operator j
.zmp0
can be considered as a
.90
opera-
tor [3].
Property 2.
 
j
.tqx 
f
0x7
j
.
f
0 u
j
.tqr0
This property can be viewed as “deontic detachment”
[2].
Property 3.
 
j
.tqr0 u
l
.tqr0
 
j
.tqx 
f
0 u
l
.tqx 
f
0
The proof is immediate. The property is intuitively cor-
rect, because a preference is weaker than a requirement.
Property 4. Requirements cannot be inconsistent. In other
words  *2W. j .ﬂqs0Z7 j .21qs0Q0 and  k2W. j .tqx f 0Z7 j .ﬂ21qx }0L0 if
 	 u
f .
Inconsistency management is a very important field of
RE, because tolerating temporary inconsistent requirements
offers more alternatives to obtain the final specifications [7,
8, 5]. As we consider that we want to represent a set of
already elicited requirements, this property is not awkward.
2.6. Example
Let us consider the following example. We want to de-
velop a database with a server. We want also a correspond-
ing HTML page to access this database. But, if there is no
database, we do not create the web page, because this is no
worth creating a web page to access it. The absolute re-
quirements here are: there is a database. The conditional
requirement we can emit are if there is no database, there is
no web page and if there is a database, there is a web page.
We represent “there is a database” by the proposi-
tional letter
 
f and “there is a web page to access it”
by  . We model those requirements by the set  

j
.  
f
0J
j
.2;; 2  
f
0
j
. 1  
f
0
. Notice that if we can-
not create the web page, there is no explicit requirement
about the database. The model of  is:

a
X	
e

a
c}X	
e c

a
cX

e c

a
X	
Notice that in this case, there is only one model of  , but
there could be more models in other cases.
3. Deducing goals from a set of ordered worlds
The second point we study in this paper is the distribu-
tion of goals among a group of executing agent from a set
of requirements. As we saw before, we can express require-
ments as orders on worlds, ie   models. A set of re-
quirements can be represented as a set of ordered worlds
(see example 2.6). We want now derive goals from this set
of ordered worlds. In this section, we present the technics
of Boutilier in [2] to derive goals.
3.1. Ideal goals
To determine its goals, an agent must have some knowl-
edge about the real world. Boutilier introduces   , a finite
and consistant set of propositional letters, to represent the
knowledge of the agent about the real world. We call   a
knowledge base. Given   and a   model, the ideal sit-
uations are caracterized by the most preferred worlds which
statisfy

 . The formal definition is (notice that, unlike
Boutilier, we focus on semantics):
Definition 6. Let  be a set of requirements and  6 
all its possible models1. Let   be a knowledge base and

.

0>

! 

  !
.
For 
$

ﬀ
,
ﬂﬁ
ﬃ is the restriction of  ﬃ to

.

0
worlds2.
1remember that each model is a set of ordered worlds
2 ! 
" is obtained by considering #" and deleting any worlds which
does not satisfy $ﬀ%'&'(*)+
An ideal goal derived from  is a propositional formula
!
so that:
#,
$

ﬀW
ﬁ
ﬃ
 
l
.ﬂ!10
Let us resume our previous example, i.e. 


j
.t
f
0J
j
.2;; 2  
f
0
j
. 1  
f
0-
. Suppose that there is a
database, i.e.   

2  
f

. In this case, the only restricted
model of  is:
c

a
c}X

e c

a
X	
So in the ideal situations, 2; is true. Ideally, the agent
has not to create the web page.
3.2. Controlability of propositions
By the previous definition, every formula ! which statis-
fies #.
$
/
0ﬀW ﬁ
ﬃ
 
l
.t!>0
is a goal for the agent. But,
as Boutilier notes, this definition is fair only if   is fixed.
If the agent can change the truth of some elements in

 ,
ideal goals as previously defined may be too restrictive. If
there is no database (i.e.     2   f  ) but the agent can
build the database (this a quite reasonable assumption), then
we cannot derive the agent goals from
2
 
f . So, for deriv-
ing goals, Boutilier suggests considering only the formulas
whose truth cannot be changed by the agent’s actions.
Furthermore, as Boutilier notes, even if the agent can
emit preferences about propositions over which he/she has
no control (he/she may prefer that it is sunny for instance),
calling those propositions a goal is unreasonable.
To cature such distinctions, Boutilier introduces a sim-
ple agent’s ability model to demonstrate its influence on
goals. He partitions the atomic propositions in two classes:


21  , in which  is the set of atomic propositions
that the agent can control (i.e. the agent can change the
truth value of those propositions) and  is the set of atomic
propositions that the agent cannot control.
Then he generalizes this notion as follows:
Definition 7. For any set of atomic variables  , let 3 .  0
be the set of truth assignments to this set. If  $ 3 .  0 and
 $
3
.54 0 for disjoint sets  and 4 , then 76 v$ 3 . 81
4n0 denotes the obvious extendede assignment. The neutral
element of 6 is 3 .x0 which is the empty truth assignement.
Definition 8. A proposition ! is controlable iff, for all 9 $
3
.

0
, there is some 
$
3
.

0
and some
 $
3
.

0
so
that :6;9
 k!
and

6<9
 *21!
.
A proposition
!
is influenceable iff, for some 9 $ 3 .  0 ,
there is some 
$
3
.

0
and some '$ 3 .  0 so that 76<9  
!
and  6<9  *21! .
A proposition
!
is uninfluenceable iff it is not influence-
able.
For instance, of
q $
 and f $  , then q 7 f is influ-
enceable but not controlable.
Definition 9. The ininfluenceable belief set of
an agent is defined by   l .  0   ! $

.

0 )!
is ininfluenceable  .
In a first part of his work, Boutilier considers that
 
l
. 

0
is complete, i.e. the truth value of all uncontrol-
lable atoms is known. We will limit our work to this case.
Under this hypothesis, Boutilier defines the notion of CK-
goal as follows:
Definition 10. Let  be a set of requirements and
 6   
all its possible models. Let   be a knowledge
base such that
 
l
. 

0
is complete.
For 
$

0ﬀ
,

ﬃ is the restriction of  ﬃ to
 
l
. 

0
worlds.
A CK goal derived from  is a proposition ! so that:
#,
$

0ﬀU

ﬃ
 
l
.ﬂ!10
and ! is controllable
Let us resume our example. Suppose now that there is
no database and that nobody can build the database (nobody
has the ability to build the database). So 2   f $    and
 
f
$
 . The restricted models ﬃ of  are:
c

a
c}X

e
c

a
X

Suppose that the agent can create the web page, i.e.
$
 . In this case,
2;
is a CK goal derived from  : the agent
will have not to create the web page.
4. Distribution of a set of requirements among
a set of executing agents
We will now consider a group of executing agents  

qr6d}Qq 
. As defined previously, if we want to deter-
mine the CK goals of  , we must know which propositions
are controllable by  . Most of the time, we only know the
controllable atoms for each agent q	 . In order to determine
the formulas controllable by  , we must first extend the
controllability notion to a group of agents.
4.1. Extension of controllability
We will extend the notion of controllability introduced
by Boutilier (a dichotomy over the set of propositional let-
ters) by partitioning the set of atoms in two classes for each
agent :
Definition 11. For each agent q	 $  , we partition the
atoms in two classes:  
 that represents the atoms which
are in the controllability domain of q  and  
 that repre-
sents the atoms which are not in the controllability domain
of q  .
We keep the same extension to formulas as Boutilier.
Notice that the agents’ controllability domain are not nec-
essary disjoint. Two different agents may be competent to
achieve the same action.
We express now the relation between agent’s controlla-
bility and group’s controllability.
Definition 12. A proposition
!
is semi-controllable by a
group  iff  so that # q   $ sS ﬁ controllable
proposition by q ﬁ so that  .
ﬀﬂﬁ

S
ﬁ
0 u
S .
A proposition S is controllable by a group  iff S is semi-
controllable by  and 2 S is semi-controllable by  .
Let us take an example. let

q 6d q/ be a group of agents
so that

is controllable by q 6 and ﬃ is controllable by qs: .
What is the controllability of . pR \0s7 . ﬃ R !<0 for

q 6<Qq
?
On one hand, as
.  7
ﬃ
0u@.  R"\0;7?.
ﬃ
R#!<0
, and as

is
controllable by
q
6
and ﬃ is controllable by
q
:
,
.  R$\0 7 .
ﬃ
R%!<0
is semi-controllable by

q
6
Qq
:

. On the other hand,
.27 7
2&\0 R .2
ﬃ
7 2'!<0
is not semi-controllable by

q
6
Qq
:
 (you
can choose
;.(\0g y
and
;.(!<0W y ), so .  R)\0 7. ﬃ R*!<0
is not controllable by

q 6  q :	
.
We can now introduce the definition of a CK goal for
a group  . We first clarify the definition of

 and
 
l
.

0
.
Definition 13.   is a finite and consistant set of propo-
sitional formulas.   l .  0   !     
!
et
!
is not controllable by   .   is supposed to be
complete.
Definition 14. Let  be a set of requirements,  6   
all its possible models and #. $

<ﬀ
,

ﬃ be defined
as in definition 10.
A CK goal derived from  for  is a propositional for-
mula ! so that:

!
is controllable by 
#.
$
/
0ﬀW
+
ﬃ
 
l
.t!>0
If we want to determine the effective tasks that each ex-
ecuting agent must achieve in order to realize the group’s
goals, we have to modelize the commitments of the agents.
Let us resume our example: if we have two agents,
q
6
who
can create the database and
qsT
who can create the web
page,
q
:
’s task about the web page depends on
q
6
’s com-
mitment about the database (if q 6 undertakes to not create
the database for instance).
4.2. Agents commitments
Let
q be an agent of  . To represent q	 ’s commit-
ments, we use two sets of controllable literals: j    .tq ﬁ 0
et j

 
.tq
ﬁ
0
. They are defined as follows:
 if  is a literal and controllable by
q 
, 
$
j

  
.ﬂq  0
means “
q 
commits itself to do 
 if  is a literal and controllable by q  ,  $ j    .ﬂq\0
means “
q
commits itself to not do 
The following tabular summarize our modelization of
sentences as “
q
commits itself to do  ”.
Sentence to modelize Modelization
q
ﬁ commits itself 
$
j

  
.tq
ﬁ
0
to do 
q
ﬁ commits itself 
$
j

  
.ﬂq
ﬁ
0
not to do 
q
ﬁ does not commit  4$ j    .tq ﬁ 0
itself to do 
q
ﬁ does not commit  4$ j    .ﬂq ﬁ 0
itself not to do 
We must impose consistency constraints to j

  and
j

  : an agent
q
cannot commit itself to do  and 2  and
q
cannot commit itself to do  and not to do  .
Constraint 1. # q  $  j     .tq  0 is consistent and
j

 

.tq

0
is consistent.
Constraint 2. # qn$  j    .ﬂq|0	 j    .tq\0>*
Definition 15. j

 

.

0
is the set of all agents positive
commitments:
j

 
.

08 


 ﬂﬁ
j

 
.ﬂq|0
j

 
.

0
is the set of all agents “negative” commit-
ments:
j

 
.

08


$ 


#
qn$
8 controllable by q

2

$
j

 
.ﬂq\0-
j

 

.

0
means: if all the agents which control  com-
mit themselves not to do  and if 2  $   , then 2  will
remain true. This supposes that there is no external inter-
vention.
We emit an hypothesis about the consistency of commit-
ments with the group’s CK goals:
Hypothesis 1.
#ﬃS 
 
l
.
S
  
l
. 

0Q0
and S controllable by  
j

 
.

0
1 j

 
.

0
1

S

is consistent
This hypothesis allows to avoid some problematic cases,
for instance:
 the case where two agents which control  com-
mit themselves one to do  , the other to do 2  (i.e.
j

 
.

0
unconsistent)
 the case where there is a variable  so that all the agents
that control  commit themselves not to do  and not to
do 2  (i.e. j    .  0 unconsistent);
 the case where the agents’ commitments contradict a
group’s CK goal, for instance if  is a CK goal of the
group and all the agents that control  commit them-
selves to do 2  .
In order to distribute goals to a group of agents, we must
first verify the consistency of agents’ commitments with
group’s CK goals. If the consistency is not verified, the
agents must change their commitments.
4.3. Effective goals of an agent
If hypothesis 1 is verified, we are certain that the agents
commitments are not contradictory with the group’s CK
goal. We want now to determine the effective goals of
each agent. Those goals are not CK goals, because, as we
saw previously, each agent’s goals do not depend only on
 
l
.

0
but also on the other agents’ commitments. It is
intuitively correct to derive agent
q

goals from:
 the propositions which are uncontrollable by  , i.e.
 
l
.

0
 the set of agents’ “positive” commitments, i.e.
j

 
.

0
 the set of agents’ “negative” commitments, i.e.
j

 
.

0
We note this set
.

0
.
-.

0
is used in the condi-
tional part of the operator l
.zmn {mp0
to derive effective goals.
Definition 16.
-. 

0> 
l
.

0
1 j

 
.

0
19j

 
.

0
The notion of effective goal of an agent is defined as fol-
lows:
Definition 17. Let  be a set of requirements and

6
  

its models. Let

 be a knowledge base such
that
 
l
. 

0
is complete.
For 
$
/
0ﬀ
,

ﬃ is the restriction of  ﬃ to
-.

0
worlds.
A proposition
!
is an effective goal for q	 derived from
 (we note j q  
 .ﬂ!10 iff:
#.
$

<ﬀW
ﬃ
 
l
.t!>0

!
is controllable by q	
We use the l
.zmn {mp0
operator to determine the effective
goal, so we are certain that an agent cannot have contradic-
tory effective goals.
We define also a notion of unsatisfied CK goal. If ! is
a CK goal for  , and if no agent has
!
 for effective goal
with 
!

u !
, then
!
is unsatisfied.
Definition 18. Let ! be a CK goal of  . ! is unsatisfied
iff :


 
 ﬂﬁ

!


j
q

 

.t!

0   !
We note it  
 !dqJ.t!>0
.
4.4. Example
Let us resume the example of section 2.6. Let us consider
a group of two agents 


q 6dQqZ:	
. We want to modelize
the following requirements for  :
 there is a database
 if there is no database, there is no web page
 if there is a database, there is a web page
The set of requirements  is



j
.
 
f
0J
j
.2;; 2
 
f
0
j
. 1 
 
f
0
whose only
model is:

a
X	
e

a
c}X	
e
c

a
cX

e
c

a
X	
1. Suppose that  


2
 
f
 2; 
, i.e. that the
database and the web page are not yet created. Sup-
pose that 
.tq
6
0&

 
f

and 
.ﬂq
:
0 

 
. In
this case, the CK goal for  are
 
f ,
 
f
uh
and
2
 
f
u 2;
. Suppose that
q
6
and
q
: do not commit
themselves for anything. In this case,
-.

09 
and the restricted model of  is:

a
X	
e

a
c}X

e c

a
c}X	
e c

a
X

The effective goals are j 
q


Y
.
 
f
0
and
j 
q


[
.tﬃ0
.
qr6
has the task to create the database
and qZ: has the task to create the web page.
2. Suppose that  


2  
f
 2; 
, 
.tq 6d0 

 
f

,

.tqr6d0 

 
. In this case, the CK goal for  are
 
f ,
 
f
u 
and
2  
f
u 2;
. If
q 6 does not com-
mit itself for anything and
q :
commits itself not to do
 (for instance, q : has no time to create the web
page), then j     .  0  2;  , because q : is the
only agent who can do

and he decides not to do

. So
-. 

0>

2; 
and the restricted model is:

a
cX

e c

a
c}X

The effective goals are j 
q


Y
.  
f
0
and
j 
q


[
.ﬂ2;x0
.
 
f
u 
is unsatisfied.
Notice that if
q 6
commits itself to do
 
f , then hypoth-
esis 1. is falsified, because
 
f
u 
is a CK goal
of the group

q 6 Qq : 
. The agents has to update their
commitments.
3. Suppose that
 
f is uncontrollable and   

2
 
f
2;  (the database cannot be created, indepen-
dently of the agents, for instance nobody knows how
to create a database) and that  is controllable by q 6
and
q
:
. Then the CK goal of

q
6
Qq
:

is
2;
, i.e. the
restricted model of  to calculate the CK goals is:
c

a
c}X	
e c

a
X

The agents cannot commit themselves to do  , be-
cause
2;
is a CK goal of  . They have to “maintain”
2;
. Notice that if
 $
 in this case, the agents
must delete the web page to fulfill the CK goal.
4. Suppose now that
 
f is uncontrollable and   

 
f
2;  (the database is alreday created for in-
stance) and that  is controllable by q 6 and qZ: . Then
the CK goal of

qr6<QqZ: 
is

. If
qr6 does not commit
itself to anything and if qs: commits itself to do  , the
restricted model is:

a
X	
In this case, both agents has to create the web page, be-
cause we can derive j q   Y . ﬃ0 and j  q   [ . x0 .
We will discuss this case in the next section.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a formalism which al-
lows one to represent requirements as orders on possible
worlds and to determine from a set of requirements given
a group of executing agents and a agency model for each
agent:
 the controllable propositions by the group
 the CK goals of the group
 the effective goals of each executing agent
The first point we developed is the representation of re-
quirements. According to us, a requirement cannot be only
viewed as a most preferred world, but should also induce
some less ideal cases. Dealing with such less ideal cases
allows one to have a representation of alternatives that the
participant in the RE process could use (for instance if a re-
quirement is impossible to fulfill). We used the logic 
to express orders on worlds and two operators j .Lmp0 and
j
.zmn {mp0
to express requirements.
The second point we were interested in is the distribution
of requirements among a group of executing agents. As we
wrote in the introduction section, the distribution process
can be used to verify requirements or simulate the building
of the product concerned by the requirements. For instance,
in example 4.4.2, the requirement
 
f
u 
is unsatisfied,
because qZ: commits itself not do  . In this case, even if the
requirements are consistent, correct... the project cannot be
achieved because of one executing agent. Verifying that the
creation of an “item” that will satisfy all the requirements is
possible can be a new source for validation of requirements.
Let us notice that according to the definition of an ef-
fective goal, two executing agents may have the same tasks
to realize. In example 4.4.4,
q
6
and
q
:
have both to cre-
ate the web page ( j  q   Y .tﬃ0 and j q   [ .tﬃ0 ). We
can consider this case as “cooperation” between
q
6
and
q
:
.
But only
qZ:
committed itself to do  . Is it efficient to ask
qs6
for doing  ? This optimization problem can be solved
by using different “efficiency” criterions. Suppose that q6
had a lot of other effective goals (a very loud task charge),
then it would be judicious to remove  from qr: ’s effec-
tive goals. We could also introduce a preference order on
agents:
qr6
could be preferred to qZ: to do  , because qr6 is
cheaper, or faster for instance. In this case,
qr:
should let qr6
do

. In the light of such examples, working on defining
a strategy set
 

ﬃ
qJ.tq

0
for each agent would be interest-
ing.
 

ﬃ
qJ.tq

0
could be based on an order on the executing
agents for each CK goal of the group. This order can reflect
various preference relations: an agent can be preferred to
another one because it is more competent to execute a task,
because it consumes less ressources etc.
Thus, we would be able to define particular distribution
strategies for a group of agents and find the one fittest for
a specific problem (cooperation, taking the best agent for
each task...). The most interesting work is to obtain postu-
lates about
 

ﬃ
q
that permit to qualify the global strategy
given
 

ﬃ
qJ.tq  0
for each agent
q 
.
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